Lithuania, which has a population of less than 3 million, has ignited a new fight against the giant force — China. In July, Lithuania allowed the Republic of China (ROC) to establish a representative office in its capital city Vilnius under the name of Taiwan, denying the “One-China” policy enforced by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Two months later, the Lithuanian government urged its people to discard phones made by Chinese manufacturers due to the rising suspicions that they were part of a censorship system that detected phrases such as “free Tibet” and “democracy movement.” In the context of this small country’s defiance against an economic powerhouse, it is vital to monitor the relationships between countries and how the nature of global conflict may change over time.

The temporary weakening of China's economic and political power due to the influence of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) had shown signs of recovery until earlier this year. While the world still suffers from COVID-19, the reduction in the number of confirmed cases in China had allowed the country to halt lockdowns and return to its previous production and trading levels. The rapid recovery was illustrated by the BBC, who reported that China had become the largest trade partner for the European Union (EU) in 2020, overtaking the United States (U.S.) by about 30 billion dollars.

However, the rise of Chinese dominance amid the pandemic crisis has precipitated strong anti-Chinese sentiment around the world, with various countries entering into trade conflicts with Beijing. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, China’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 18.3 percent in the first quarter of 2021 but has dropped to 7.9 percent in the second quarter, which implies the country’s domestic and overseas challenges regarding economics and trade relations.

A Small Country’s Big Move

Lithuania’s decision to establish the Taiwanese Representative Office reflects the relationship between Lithuania and Taiwan during the USSR’s military occupation of the Baltic states Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from 1940 to 1991. The USSR claimed to have legally merged the Baltics with the consent of each country, but Taiwan refused to approve of the annexation because it violated international law and the principles of bilateral treaties.

With the situation reversed, Taiwan now needs a helping hand because of the escalating conflict over the “One-China” policy – the idea that PRC is the only legal state under the control of China, as opposed to recognizing ROC as a separate, sovereign entity. China has responded to the anti-Chinese forces in Taiwan, such as the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), by restricting Taiwan’s diplomatic relations with other countries. Even under the pressure of China, Lithuania has clearly shown its existence by making independent decisions to reach out to Taiwan.  

In addition to establishing a representative office under the name of Taiwan, Lithuania has recently carried out other bold decisions that provoke China. For example, in May, Lithuania withdrew from the “17+1” initiative, a plan to promote business and investment relations between China and countries in Central and Eastern European regions. As Professor Lee Sang Joon (Eurasian Studies, Kookmin University) explains, Lithuania’s decision to cut off one of its exchanges with China is possibly due to doubts about the effectiveness of the cooperation framework.

Despite the imbalance in size and power, Lithuania has emerged as a thorn in China’s side with its recent actions. In response to this, China has retaliated against Lithuania by imposing diplomatic and economic sanctions. According to The Baltic Times, an independent monthly newspaper that covers events in all three Baltic states, Lithuanian food producers have faced difficulties in exporting goods because the certification process and approval of Lithuanian products have completely stopped in China. In addition, Beijing has recalled its ambassador from Vilnius in response to Lithuania’s violation of China’s sovereignty.

However, Lithuania’s refusal to give in to the demands of China could result in a stalemate or even a strategic loss for China. In fact, the degree of support available for Lithuania is considerably high. Professor Seo Jinseok (Institute of EU Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) remarks, “Even though Lithuania’s national defence budget only accounts for two percent of the total budget, it would be difficult for China to continue its military provocations or impose a prolonged economic sanction with the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on Lithuania’s side.”

Professor Lee further explains that Lithuania’s actions could not only encourage neighbouring Baltic countries but also affect the Visegrád Group — an organisation consisting of the Central European nations Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia — and other nations willing to maintain good relations with the EU. Newer member states of the EU and NATO have also undergone an active transition to a market economy and democratic, pluralistic society, which represents their disapproval of China’s undemocratic state system.

Moreover, as the Central News Agency (CNA) of Taiwan reported, support from the EU has become significantly apparent. The spokesperson for the European External Action Service (EEAS), also known as the EU’s diplomatic service, said, “Although this is an issue between Lithuania and China, it will inevitably affect the relations of the EU and China.” Given the EU’s interest in strengthening relations with Taiwan, its attitude towards Lithuania regarding the establishment of the Taiwanese Representative office has been positive.

A New Global Paradigm

The number of common characteristics of European countries — such as the interest in economic development and an emphasis on humanitarian values, including democracy and human rights — suggest a change in the global paradigm for diplomacy and international relations. According to Professor Seo, Lithuania's recent diplomatic moves are reflective of the growing interest in Taiwan and other East Asian countries as economic partners. “With interest in Estonia’s information technology (IT) and software industries, Lithuania is also preparing for the fourth industrial revolution by establishing a strong relationship with Taiwan, a country that looks to invest in European countries.”

In addition, since its independence from USSR, Lithuania’s government has been promoting humanitarian diplomatic cooperation. According to Professor Lee, Lithuania’s cooperation withfavor for Taiwan demonstrates the nation’s strategy to gain international support for its independence, which has been established on the values of human rights and democracy. Its protection of humanitarian values was highlighted earlier this year when Seimas, the Lithuanian parliament, adopted a resolution recognizing the forced labor of Uyghurs in Xinjiang as genocide and condemning it as a crime against humanity.

As CNA has reported, the meeting between Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis and the United States (U.S.) Secretary of the State Antony Blinken was symbolic in that “both sides confirmed a commitment for democracy and liberty, human rights and rule of law ‘in the face of increased pressure from authoritarian regimes across the globe.’” In addition to this commitment, Blinken’s reaffirmation of “ironclad U.S. solidarity with Lithuania” indicates that the global emphasis on humanitarian values may have naturally led to a wave of anti-Chinese sentiment because the current Chinese ideology is not in accordance with the contemporary values pursued by international society.

“Lithuania's remarkable actions highlight the need to build stronger solidarity against a state force that hinders the development of liberal democracy and a free economy,” explains Professor Seo. “China's political provocation against the EU has raised the possibility of European solidarity that goes beyond mere declarative remarks and leads to practical actions.”

A Silent Threat

EU member states are not the only countries that have begun standing up to China. For example, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced on September 15 that Australia would enter AUKUS, a stronger trilateral security partnership with the UK and the U.S. He stated that “this is a historic opportunity for our countries to strengthen our nations’ security in uncertain times.” The recent trade war between Australia and China may have influenced Canberra’s choice to counter Chinese influence through AUKUS. The almost three-year-long dispute began with the Australian ban on Huawei imports in 2018, which signalled the start of Canberra’s move towards strengthening diplomatic ties with Washington at the cost of relations with Beijing. This most likely tied in with the need for the other members of AUKUS to stand up against Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific, eventually leading to the creation of the alliance.

One of the most notable elements of AUKUS is that it includes a pact on the allocation of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, making it the eighth country in the world to possess them. Nuclear-powered submarines, which differ from nuclear submarines in that the former are merely powered by nuclear fission while the latter has nuclear strike capability, are a force to be reckoned with and for good reason. They are far quieter than their diesel counterparts and do not have to surface for refuelling during their 30-year-long lifespan, meaning that power can be exerted over far greater distances — enough to cover the entire Eastern Indo-Pacific.

“AUKUS is clearly a top-level alliance that seeks to unite the five major Anglosphere countries — the UK, the U.S., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand — although the re-election of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in Canada and the strong anti-nuclear stance held by Wellington exclude the latter two for now,” explains Professor Lee. “While the official statement claims that AUKUS aims to strengthen security in the Indo-Pacific and establish stronger information ties, the global consensus seems to be that AUKUS is a strongly anti-Chinese alliance.”

This is not the only view on AUKUS however, with Professor Woo June-Mo (International Relations, Sun Moon University) taking a slightly different approach to the matter. “It is yet too early to judge what intentions lie behind AUKUS,” he says, “while the consensus may be that this is an American effort at an anti-Chinese alliance, the trust that American allies used to have in the U.S. is faltering.” After the disastrous demobilisation in Afghanistan and the repeated changes in diplomatic attitudes under former President Donald Trump and his successor President Biden, Professor Woo has observed various cracks in the global American alliance network. “The possibility of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) — another anti-Chinese alliance between Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. — falling apart is just the tip of the iceberg. What is really important is that the age of U.S. hegemony has begun to show its flaws and limits.”

However, it cannot be denied that, while the days of the U.S. being the sole superpower in the world may be coming to an end, it still has the power to counter Chinese efforts to strong-arm other nations. Professor Lee postulates that we could potentially see further anti-Chinese measures such as the expansion of the Five Eyes — an intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the U.S., that was originally created as an anti-Soviet measure but has shifted into an anti-Chinese stance after the Cold War. Yet he suggests that the intricate trade ties that firmly bridge China with the world make this new rivalry a far more complicated situation than the previous conflict between the U.S. and the USSR. A more likely scenario would instead be a more muted battle for hegemony between the U.S. and China, with care taken so that the conflict does not affect either side too seriously.

The fact that trade is a significant factor in this new zeitgeist is proved by the aforementioned trade war between China and Australia. Chinese bans on Australian wine, barley, and lobster imports dealt a significant blow to the Australian economy, yet Canberra held steadfast in its position. Professor John Blaxland (International Security and Intelligence Studies, Australian National University) explains the situation as “a conundrum of the likes of which we haven't seen in generations,” and that while “historically, Australian leaders have sought to balance the security ties with the U.S., with the trade interests with China … the consensus has emerged that we will double down on ties with the United States and push back on threats and coercion from China.” This could even mean that Beijing’s attempt at weaponizing trade may turn on themselves, with China already feeling the sudden dearth in crucial supplies such as coal and copper. Trade in its modern iteration is a two-way affair, and one cannot always put pressure through sanctions without feeling the effects of the ultimatum oneself. “Countries which have weaponised trade cannot always ‘win’,” says Tianlei Huang, a research fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

A Silent Fracture

Another major issue surrounds the announcement of the formation of AUKUS besides the backlash from Beijing however, with several loose ties leading to an enraged France. Back in 2018, Canberra signed a contract with Paris for the purchase of French diesel-powered submarines. The contract was abruptly cancelled with the formation of AUKUS. Paris expressed its outrage at being informed of the cancellation barely a day before the formation of AUKUS. The French Embassy argued that “the American choice to exclude an EU ally and partner such as France from a structuring partnership with Australia, at a time when we are facing unprecedented challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, shows a lack of coherence that France can only note and regret.”

While Professor Lee speculates that this breach of trust may not completely fracture the bonds between AUKUS and the EU, he still expresses concern that it may take a long time to heal these wounds. “Combined with the various diplomatic catastrophes that the Biden administration went through during the demobilisation in Afghanistan, whether this rupture can be repaired is hard to determine.”

One of the factors that may influence the outcome of the French-AUKUS fracture may in fact be Vilnius. Professor Woo explains that, while the U.S. and AUKUS are more concerned about China, the European mainland is far more occupied with Russia. He opines that the reason why Vilnius was able to stand up to Beijing is that Lithuania has too few ties with China to be pressured effectively in the first place. Instead, the EU is tensely watching how their Eastern neighbor fares.

“The problem lies, however, in that the EU is not a singular country, meaning that, while the Eastern members of the Bloc are open to finding any allies — mostly the U.S. — that are willing to spare them the fate of Ukraine, the Western members are more open to cooperating with Moscow,” explained Professor Woo. This may be the key reason why Lithuania has been taking anti-Chinese actions. Vilnius, along with many other Eastern members of the EU, have judged that the security of their future lies not in Brussels, but instead in Washington. Thus, they have begun to fall into step with the general diplomatic stage that the US has set up — one with a black-and-white distinction that divides the American side and the Chinese side.

A Silent Future

Whilst the uncomfortable prospects in Europe are a problem in themselves, they also serve to cast a shadow on Korea’s foreign policy. Being only a footstep away from China, Korea has undeniably been affected by Beijing’s whims throughout history. This does not mean that Korea is forever doomed to crawl under the figurative Chinese boot, which the current Korean government seems to be content with.

Of course, the economic pressure that Beijing can exert on Korea is immense, with Chinese imports comprising a quarter of Korea’s heavily export-oriented economy. However, this does not mean that Korea needs to follow every single one of Beijing’s orders, which was the case during the early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak.

While it is obvious that the current direction Korea is heading in is not ideal, the direction that it should follow is not entirely clear. Professor Park Jae Jeok (Graduate School of International and Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) believes that the Korean situation involves a difficult choice. “It’s a multi-dimensional, N-person game,” he says, “and there are multiple directions that Korea could potentially head in. While the current government seems to prioritize diplomacy with North Korea over everything, I don’t necessarily condone these policies.” When asked what a diplomatically successful Korea would look like, Professor Park narrows the choice to two paths: “We either have to make a choice in where we stand like Australia and Japan or attempt to act as a bridge between the U.S. and China.”

“The latter option could take the form of facilitating meetings or military exercises that include China to ease tensions in the region, but the viability of this strategy is questionable.” He continues, “While there’s always the option of entirely distancing ourselves from the rivalry, the possibility of that happening is even lower. Therefore, it really is up to the policymakers of the new government to decide where we’re heading.”

Professor Woo echoes these sentiments, opining that there is no set path for Korea to follow. “I merely wish that whatever party comes to hold power in the next election decides to carefully balance their options.” He does, however, cast a warning: “Power in a relative sense is the ability to make another party accept your values over their own in a situation where multiple values clash, and it is soft power that defines the current American hegemony.” However, Professor Woo believes that the use of soft power to influence the world is not entirely due to the recent decline in American power nor the global decentralisation of strength. He believes that the future is yet uncertain and that the decision on the direction of the country should come after enough contemplation.

While it is worrying that there still is not an agreement on the future of Korea with regards to its relationship with China, the situation does highlight the need for a central diplomatic policy. Whether this is a pro-American or a more neutral stance is up for debate. The current lack of coherent strategies for Korea’s diplomatic relationships is the most serious problem that it faces, meaning that it is imperative that the nation decides where it will stand on the global stage. That decision may not have to be finalized immediately, but what the Lithuanian-Chinese standoff and the establishment of AUKUS have taught Korea, however, is that the deadline is much closer than expected.