South Korea’s total fertility rate (TFR) was the lowest globally in 2020, reported Statistics Korea, having recorded a grim 0.84 children per woman. A declining fertility rate is a typical phenomenon in advanced countries; however, the discrepancy between Korea’s rate of 0.84 and those of other developed countries such as the United Kingdom’s (UK) 1.79 or France’s 1.92 seems to suggest that national advancement may not be the only contributing factor to Korea’s birth stagnation.

Certain distinguishing factors in Korea seem to be determining this small number. In fact, the intensification of these factors seems to have led South Korea to show a particular decrease in TFR results in the last few years. The issues that bestowed upon Korean society a problematically low birth rate have to do with several recently risen reasons complexly linked to each other, including financial income inequality and uncertainty of the future.

Possible Reasons for a Low Birth Rate

To raise a child in South Korea, one requires a lot of money, which in turn is hard to earn. The truth is, the reality does not allow Korean youth in their 20s to fulfill the minimum requirements for raising a child as “the polarization of wealth, high levels of income inequality, and fierce competition are too high,” stated Professor Chin Meejung (Department of Child Development and Family Studies, Seoul National University). Therefore, arranging a proper residence and living necessities for oneself is now considered an arduous task, and having a child is something extra to contemplate after that difficult task is achieved.

Moreover, the severe competition in Korean society has made parents’ massive financial investment in education an obligation. Professor Chin used the term “intensive parenting” to explain a condition where parents intensively invest enormous funds to ensure that their children win the chaotic academic battle towards university acceptance. As such, the colossal financial input required to raise a child is another factor that burdens Korean youth and consequently obstructs them from going through with it.

The real estate price increase in Seoul and nearby areas, where half of the entire Korean population is situated, is an additional facet generating a low fertility rate. According to statistical data reported by Chosun Biz, real estate prices, particularly in Seoul’s Gangnam area — the area with one of the highest real estate prices — have risen at an average of 34 percent during the past three years. In comparison, the minimum wage was only elevated by 15.8 percent in the same period.

Although price increase in real estate is not entirely dependent on governmental policies, one thing the authorities underestimated and failed to prepare for was the public’s mixed psychology of desire to maximize unearned income and fear of the rising price of real estate that eventually lead to unprecedented price escalation. In other words, the Korean estate market surpassed the basic logic of “demand is indirectly proportional to price,” and faced constant demand despite tremendous growth in price.

Furthermore, people now often lean towards staying single and reconsider marriage, which Korea conventionally treats as the step before raising children. The society as a whole is becoming more individualistic and actively deviating from the traditional idea of a person being part of a couple or even a parent. It should be noted that decisions about marriage and childbirth are not only determined by personal conditions, but also “influenced by social conditions,” stated Professor Chin. Moreover, the Korean society is now Transitioning to be more accommodating of unconventional family units such as one-person households, DINK (double income, no kids) couples living with only pets, and even families consisting simply of friends with mutual interests.

The Risk and the Solutions

Such a decline in the number of people in the new generations may not only impact the economy severely but also cause a total collapse of South Korea in a few hundred years, as reported by YTN. What really matters is the labor force’s upcoming and drastic decrease in size. Moreover, YTN additionally stated the gloomy prospect that by the end of 2055, the number of senior citizens over the age of 65 will overtake the number of youth in the labor force, exhausting national pension reserves as the only increasing population is the ones to support.

Furthermore, JoongAng Ilbo’s forecast that “women might have to join the force to fill up the quota [in the military]” is already being discussed since by the end of 2030, the number of soldiers will not be up to par with its required number of 300 thousand. Moreover, the workforce responsible for the 3D jobs — difficult, dirty, and dangerous — will have no choice but to be attracted from abroad, leading to inefficient cost management.

One of the most crucial things to understand is that South Korea’s population is strangely concentrated in only a few major cities, such as Seoul, including their metropolitan areas. Consequently, infrastructure such as education, medical care, and cultural facilities are likewise heavily concentrated. It follows that most young Koreans wish to live in big cities to easily access their workplace and leisure activities.

Therefore, one key to solving the problem of a low birth rate may lie in balanced regional development. The idea is to give faith that the quality of life remains at similar levels even if an individual leaves the metropolitan area for other parts. On the other hand, Professor Chin is “not sure if the problem will be solved by balanced regional development,” as the fertility rates in other parts of Korea are equally low and, so, has asserted another solution.

Professor Chin suggested that for the birth rate issue to be solved, the competitive social atmosphere must be mitigated to encourage a better parent-child relationship. She emphasized the importance of being a supportive parent, claiming that if children are raised in a stressful environment, they tend to negatively consider marriage, parenting, and childbirth. Moreover, Professor Chin agreed to the criticism that about half of the 40 trillion won in the national budget allotted for boosting the fertility rate has not been effective in terms of solving this specific issue because it was indirectly used in places such as education infrastructure instead of direct cash support.

Korea is in an interval stage where it should significantly rethink and alter its approach towards the current problem. Similar to what Professor Chin stated, it is the duty of the nation to create an atmosphere in which young people can achieve what they want without burden and start a family. Thus, Korea should instead seek ways to ensure effective policies that would solve the problem of low birth rate and guard national competence.